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reasoning, econometric skills, and a sensitivity to history. Yet, it is through works like this 
that the theory of institutional change can best advance. We need more such works in order 
to generalize (theorize) about the political and economic conditions for institutional change. 
I will assign this book to my graduate students as a model of how to do applied work in 
institutional economics. 
LEE J. ALSTON, University of Illinois at Urbana/Champaign 
Two-Party Politics in the One-Party South: Alabama's Hill Country, 1874-1920. By 
Samuel L. Webb. Tuscaloosa and London: The University of Alabama Press, 1997. 
Pp. xi, 220. $34.95. 
Woodrow Wilson received only 70 percent of the votes in the 1912 presidential election 
in Alabama, a dozen years after the disfranchisement of many poor whites and over 90 
percent of the state's then overwhelmingly Republican African-Americans. What was the 
lineage of the remainder of the largely white Republican voters of 1912? Were they new 
men, industrialists and their allies, or employees in Birmingham and other cities, attracted 
by the Republicans' traditional high tariff stance and alienated by the Democratic party of 
William Jennings Bryan? Were they ex-Unionists, nonslaveholders from the Hill Country 
in the north or the Wiregrass region in the south who had opposed the Black Belt slavocra- 
cy before the Civil War, joined the Republican party during Reconstruction, and stayed 
more or less loyal to it afterwards? Or were they latter-day Jacksonian communitarian 
opponents of "the market," as well as of strong government and Reconstruction activism, 
independent voters in the 1880s and Populists in the 1890s? Studying some of the major 
political leaders who opposed the Democrats in 15 (chiefly, in 5) Hill Country counties 
from the 1870s through 1920, Samuel L. Webb emphasizes the third group and says that 
they mostly backed the "progressive" Theodore Roosevelt, not the more "conservative" 
William Howard Taft. 
Webb advances what might be called the "Bull Moose Populist" thesis to counter 
Sheldon Hackney's discontinuitarian view in Populism to Progressivism in Alabama 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1969) that Populists were not modern reformers, 
but reactionary agrarians. Disillusioned after being fraudulently counted out and then en- 
gulfed by the Democrats in the 1890s and losing potential black and poor white supporters 
in the disfranchisement of 1901, the Populists, according to Hackney, took little part in the 
progressive movement. Although Webb shows convincingly that some Populist leaders 
converted to Rooseveltian Republicanism and were not as irrational and anxious about their 
status as Hackney contends, Webb's unsystematic methods undermine any generalizations 
about the behavior ofthe masses ofPopulist voters or even of lesser Populist leaders. More- 
over, Webb's cultural-ideological interpretation of Populists as the direct heirs of anti- 
centralized power Jacksonianism contradicts his view ofthem as subsequent Bull Moosers. 
Roosevelt accepted massive, corporations and sought a powerful government to regulate 
them. In any event, because Democrats completely controlled state-level policy in Alabama 
after 1901, ex-Populists who became Republicans could play no effective role in progres- 
sivism in the state. Even if Hackney mischaracterized the Populists, then, he was right to 
call them irrelevant to Alabama progressivism. 
Although Webb repeats the Mills Thornton/Steven Hahn thesis (Thornton, Power and 
Politics in a Slave Society: Alabama, 1810-1860 [Baton Rouge and London: Louisiana 
State University Press, 1978]; and Hahn, The Roots ofSouthern Populism: Yeoman Farm- 
ers and the Transformation of the Georgia Upcountry, 1850-1890 [New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1983]) that upcountry yeomen were antigovemment and anticapitalist, his 
evidence does not support that thesis. For example, two ofthe most important independent- 
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Republican leaders in the 1880s, William Manning Lowe and Benjamin M. Long, had been 
antebellum Whigs, not Jacksonians, and Long was a coal mining entrepreneur who favored 
a high tariff and federal aid to education (pp. 63-64,69, 73). Indeed, in contrast to Thorn- 
ton's libertarian thesis, many independent and Populist legislators strongly supported 
spending more money-federal, state, or local-on schools (pp. 85, 97). Another key 
leader, Col. James M. Sheffield, was not a subsistence-oriented yeoman, but a rich cotton 
planter and owner of more than 20 slaves, who, though an erstwhile opponent of secession, 
spent $60,000 of his own money outfitting the Confederate troops he raised. Like many 
other upcountry Democratic politicians, Sheffield bolted from the Democratic party not out 
of ideology, but because he believed he'd been robbed of a nomination for office (pp. 38, 
41, 53). Populist leader A. P. Longshore was a lawyer, general store owner, and longtime 
chief executive of Shelby County who dabbled in real estate and lent money-hardly proof 
that part of what Webb calls the "core" of Populism was "anti-creditor" (pp. 92-93, 186) 
And when Webb wants a Jacksonian-style comment about post-Civil War events, he is 
often forced to range from any upcountry source to Black Belt newspaper editor Robert 
McKee (pp. 48-51, 55, 62, 124, 12, 215). 
It is true, of course, that elites rarely entirely resemble the masses they lead. But because 
he performs no statistical analysis of election returns and does not systematically trace the 
previous or subsequent political stances of leaders below the topmost county level, Webb 
cannot tell whether the elites' experiences were like those of their followers or not. More- 
over, the majority of voters and political activists in the Hill Country were Democrats. 
Without studying them, as well as the opposition politicians, Webb cannot validly general- 
ize about what motivated politicians' divergent political courses. Hill Country Democrats 
may have been the real neo-Jacksonians, or they may have differed markedly from the anti- 
Democrats in wealth, education, social status, occupation, racial views, or a whole range 
of other possible traits. And Unionist-Republicans' ideologies or social statuses may have 
been quite different from those of Populist-Republicans or industrialist-Republicans. We 
simply cannot learn such things from Webb's account because few historians, even ones 
as knowledgeable and conscientious about certain kinds of evidence as Webb is, currently 
receive training in statistics or research design. It is sad to have to conclude that Webb's 
painstaking research, forcefully argued thesis, trenchant comments on the disfranchisement 
movement and its consequences, and careful and pleasant writing style is severely under- 
mined by a conventional historical education. 
J. MORGAN KOUSSER, California Institute of Technology 
Grass-Roots Reconstruction in Texas, 1865-1880. By Randolph B. Campbell. Baton 
Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1997. Pp. x, 251. $35.00. 
Randolph Campbell adds another dimension to his extensive and authoritative work on 
nineteenth-century Texas history by studying Reconstruction on the local level. After a 
brief chapter outlining the history of Reconstruction on the state level, Campbell devotes 
a separate chapter to each of six counties-Colorado, Dallas, Harrison, Jefferson, 
McLennan, and Nueces-located in various parts of the state, each with a different mix of 
geographic, demographic, and economic characteristics. His goal is to describe and explain 
how these differences produced local variations in the course of Reconstruction. 
Colorado, an old slaveholding cotton county, differed from other old South plantation 
areas in that it had a sizeable population of immigrant Germans who opposed secession. 
The votes of unionist Germans and enfranchised blacks created a strong county Republican 
party that survived Redemption on the state level as blacks and many Germans supported 
Republican candidates until the turn of the century. Antebellum Dallas County lacked 
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